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SURFACE FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION
IN MEXICO POST NAFTA
Richard L. Clarke
Clemson University

One of the significant expressed objectives of NAFTA was the improvement of cross-border
transportation to enable a more efficient and cost effective flow of goods among Mexico,
Canada and the United States. This article examines the changes that have taken place
in surface freight transportation between Mexico and the U.S. since NAFTA was signed in
1993.

INTRODUCTION
One of the major expressed objectives of the 1993
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was to facilitate the cross-border movement of
goods and services between the territories of
Canada, Mexico and the United States. Another
objective was to increase trade among the three
countries by removing tariffs, quotas and other
trade restrictions. A review of the increases in
trade volume since 1993 provides ample evidence
that the later objective has been achieved. For
example, the number of commercial trucks
carrying U.S. exports to Mexico increased over
407% from 1990 to 2000 while the number of
trucks transporting Mexican exports to the U.S.
increased 328% over the same period. There
were a reported 2.26 million commercial truck
crossings into Mexico from Texas in 2000 and
another 2.38 million truck crossings from Mexico
into Texas (TAMIU, 2002). In the same report,
the Texas Center for Border Economic and
Enterprise Development, reported the number of
freight railcars transporting goods into Mexico
more than doubled from 1993 to 2000 from
147,216 to 298,919 (TAMIU, 2002). However, in
the ten years since NAFTA’s passage there has
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been little improvement in the cross-border
movement of goods between Mexico and the
United States.
Commercial truck movements into each
country’s interior remain a time-consuming,
inconvenient process, largely unchanged since
1990.
Neither country yet allows foreign
trucking beyond a twenty-mile commercial zone.
As a result, the promised benefits of improved
transportation, such as faster transit times,
reduced pipeline inventories and better
reliability of shipment delivery, have not yet
been realized. While cross border movement of
goods remains as cumbersome, inefficient and
unpredictable as it was prior to NAFTA, there
have been several significant improvements in
Mexico’s transportation infrastructure since
NAFTA’s passage. The purpose of this article is
two fold: to examine the progress Mexico has
made in modernizing its rail and highway
transportation modes and to outline the reasons
why there has not been much improvement in
the cross-border flow of goods between the U.S.
and Mexico. This article also reviews major
economic policy changes in Mexico and makes
recommendations on how Mexico and the United

States might achieve a better flow of goods
across their shared border.

RAIL IMPROVEMENTS IN MEXICO
Privatization
Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico (FNM),
Mexico’s national railroad, was established in
1873. It was owned and operated by the central
government of Mexico from 1937-1994. Over the
course of this 57-year period, Mexico’s rail
system suffered from neglect and severe lack of
capital funding (Barrera, 1999). As a result,
Mexico’s national railroad became slow,
unreliable and highly inefficient. The lack of
required track replacement and track
maintenance caused frequent derailments. By
1980, 75 per cent of Mexico’s existing track dated
back to pre-revolution days before 1910 (Barrera,
1999). Train robberies by organized gangs of
armed bandits were also commonplace during
this period. Approximately one in every five
trains was boarded and robbed as recently as the
late 1980’s (Kaufman, 2001).
Beginning in 1994, the Mexican government
began to address the need for significant
improvement in its freight rail system by
deciding to privatize the entire 16,500-mile
network. In the same year, the first of FNM’s
three major railway regions was sold to the
Transportation Ferroviaria Mexicana (TFM)
consortium for $1.4 billion. TFM’s winning bid
gave TFM partners the right to operate the
2,661-mile Northeast system for 50 years with
an option for an additional 50 years (Vantuono,
1999). TFM’s line is the most important of the
major FNM (Ferrocarril del Noreste) rail regions
because it provides the primary rail route in
Northern Mexico and links the industrial areas
of Mexico City and Monterey with the United
States at Laredo, Texas. Approximately 60% of
all the trade between Mexico and the United
States crosses the border at Laredo/Nuevo
Laredo (TAMIU, 2002). Although the Northeast
system controls less than 19% of the total
Mexican trackage it moves 40% of Mexico’s
domestic freight (Vantuono, 1999). For the past

four years the three TFM partners have been the
U.S.-based Kansas City Southern Industries
Corporation (37%), its Mexican affiliate,
TMM/Grupo Service (38.5%) and the Mexican
government (24.5%). By law, Mexico’s four
privatized rail systems must be at least 51%
owned by Mexican-based investors, which has
required U.S. investors to find Mexican partners.
The privatization of all four parts of the FNM
was completed last year under this ownership
rule.
The second rail freight system to become
privatized was the Ferrocarril line, a 4,052-mile
Pacific-North line and the 938 mile OjenagaTopolobampo railroad. The new owner is Grupo
Ferroviacio Mexicano Mexican Railways, a newly
formed alliance of two large Mexican companies
and the U.S.-based Union Pacific Corporation.
The Ferrocarril line connects Calexico, California
and El Paso, Eagle Pass and Brownsville, Texas
(House, 1999).
A third section, the 1,000-mile Southeast section,
is now owned by a group of Mexican investors.
The Southeast Railroad connects Mexico City
with several important ports along the Gulf
coast including Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos.
This line has the lowest revenues currently but
the highest growth potential because it links
several of Mexico’s busiest seaports. Railcars are
currently being ferried between Coatzacoalcos
and Mobile, Alabama by Gulflink Marine. There
is also reported interest in the Southeast line by
the Canadian National (CN) Railroad. With its
recent acquisition of the Illinois Central
Railroad, CN currently provides cross-border
service between Canada and the U.S. and has
routes to the Mexican border (Kaufman, 2001).

Improvements Since 1994
With privatization has come a much needed
infusion of capital to replace obsolete rolling
stock, buy new locomotives, repair and upgrade
track and install computerized control systems.
Most of the improvements have been to the
Northeast section owned by TFM and
underwritten with capital provided by Kansas
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City Southern Industries. TFM spent $90
million for infrastructure improvements within
a year of winning the operating bid and another
$600 million by the end of 2001 (KCSI, 2002).
The money has gone to purchase over 2,800 new
pieces of rolling stock, and 150 new locomotives.
TFM has also negotiated a new labor agreement,
rebuilt the main line between Mexico City and
Laredo, built a new service center and a new
computerized railroad operation center (KCSI,
2002). The investment appears to be paying off,
at least as of year ending in December 1999
versus the previous year. The 1999 revenue
from railroad operations was $524.5 million, an
increase of 22 percent over 1998 while the
operation ratio improved from 85.5% to 76.6%
(KCSI, 2002).
Mexican Railways has also invested heavily in
infrastructure movements to improve their
4,052-mile rail network. By the end of 1999,
they had spent nearly $400 million to rebuild
track, build new sidings and modernize their
fleet of railcars (Kaufman, 2001). Both new
major system owners have also beefed up
security. Mexican railways has hired 1600
security officers, put up new fences and lighting
and covered all railcar hatch covers with
fiberglass. TFM has hired over 1000 security
personnel, reducing the number of train
robberies (House, 1999). As a result, train theft
no longer appears to be a major problem as it
was before rail privatization.
The benefits of privatization are beginning to be
realized by shippers. Vantuono (1999) reports
that Mexican Railways shipped 30 percent more
grain and other agricultural commodities in 1999
than it did in 1998. The Northeast rail line
experienced similar growth from 1998 to 1999
and reduced its average transit time from Laredo
to Mexico City from 60 hours to 36 hours. As a
result of capital improvements and better track
maintenance, the newly privatized Northeast
rail line can offer shippers transit times equal to
motor carriage at lower rates. Rail privatization
has also helped cross-border transportation.
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Products moving by train from the U.S. to
Mexico’s interior can now be moved on a single
through bill of lading. Formerly, rail shipments
from the U.S. into Mexico had to be rebilled at
the border, which was often a very timeconsuming process.
Railcars must still be
switched to Mexican locomotives at the border
but since the operations are now frequently
under the control of the same company, the
switching is much more efficient than it was
before rail privatization (House, 1999).

Remaining Problems in
Cross Border Rail Freight
Incompatibilities in the customs clearance
procedures between the United States and
Mexico remain, even though the new railroads
have built customs processing yards to facilitate
clearance. Both the TFM Railroad and Mexican
Railways have built processing yards several
miles from the main border crossing at Nuevo
Laredo, but the railroads are only capable of
improving processes under their control. The
governments of the United States and Mexico
have done little to reduce the paperwork and
bureaucracy inherent in the customs clearing
process (Ross, 2001). One improvement would be
to make the shipper of record the company with
whom customs officials deal, not the railroad or
the freight-forwarder. There is often not enough
shipper involvement in the clearance process to
clearly identify who the shipper is and what is
being shipped. This issue has become a matter
of national security since 9/11.
Another problem facing the Mexican railroad
industry is a shortage of intermodal facilities
throughout the country. According to McCosh
(2001), intermodal service has improved since
rail privatization, but is still slow and inefficient.
Mexican Railways and the Northeast Railroad
are planning new intermodal facilities in Mexico
City and Guadalajara, among other places. The
Pantaco terminal in Mexico City is incapable of
handling much more traffic, but the new facility
is expected to triple the current lift capacity in

Mexico City. Intermodal movements using rail
for long hauls are expected to grow over the next
few years.

MEXICAN TRUCKING
The Mexican trucking industry currently
accounts for approximately ninety percent of all
goods transported within Mexico (Ross, 2001).
Cross-border trucking by Mexican carriers,
however, continues to be restricted to a twentymile commercial zone along the AmericanMexican border. This restriction contradicts the
North American Free Trade Agreement which
stipulated that Mexican trucks would be allowed
free access throughout the border states of
California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas by
1995. The North American Free Trade treaty
also stipulated that by January 1, 1999, trucks
from either country would be allowed crossborder access to any point in the other country.
By 2000, foreign investment in trucking
companies would be allowed up to Fifty-one
percent of the company and by 2003, 100-percent
ownership would be allowed. To date, neither
country is in compliance with these provisions.
The United States government has not given
Mexican trucks access to the United States
because of safety and labor concerns. Opposition
in the U.S. has been led by organized labor and
highway safety lobby groups. The Mexican
government has reciprocated by not allowing
American trucks access to Mexico.

U.S. Opposition to Open Borders
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
U.S. consumer groups, and U.S. insurance
underwriters have combined to create a powerful
political coalition that opposes opening the
border to Mexican trucks.
The teamsters
opposed the idea of NAFTA from its inception
based on the belief that American union
members would lose their jobs to less expensive
Mexican truckers. James Hoffa, the president of
the Teamsters Union, has been a strong and
outspoken opponent of opening the border to
Mexican trucks predicting that it would cost
several thousand union jobs (Hall, 1999).

Consumer groups, including Citizens for Reliable
and Safe Highways (CRASH), have cited
Department of Transportation (DOT) statistics
that show commercial trucks account for a
significant and disproportionate number of
highway accidents and fatalities in the United
States. For example, in 1997 the DOT reported
444,000 large-truck (greater than 10,000 pounds)
accidents in the United States, resulting in 5,355
deaths and 133,000 injuries (Leming, 1998).
Twenty percent of the reported injuries were
catastrophic, meaning loss of limbs, brain
damage, or paralysis requiring long-term
medical care.
The lack of an adequate number of U.S. truck
safety inspectors at the border has also been well
documented. For example, only four full-time
truck safety inspectors are assigned at the main
border crossing at Laredo, Texas which processes
an average of 3,850 Northbound trucks a day
(TAMIU, 2002). The insurance industry is also
concerned about the lack of hours-of-service
limits in Mexico and the incompatibility of
weight restrictions.
In Mexico, trucks are
allowed to weigh up to 130,000 pounds,
compared to the United States where the limit is
only 80,000.
The Teamsters union claims that Mexican trucks
are unsafe and that Mexican trucking will
eliminate American jobs are questionable. The
Government Accounting Office (GAO) published
a safety study in 1996 which reported that 45%
of inspected Mexican trucks did not pass safety
tests while 28% of American trucks failed the
same tests. In 2000, the GAO reported that the
number of Mexican trucks that failed safety
inspections had fallen to 36%, compared to 24%
of American trucks (GAO, 2000). The 2000
report suggested that the percentage of Mexican
trucks failing the safety inspections might be
linked to the twenty-mile limit placed on
Mexican trucks entering the United States.
According to a study by Ross (2000) Mexican
firms do not use their best trucks for short trips
across the American border into the commercial
zone. Rather, the best Mexican trucks are
reserved for long haul trips, which prevents
Spring 2003
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them from being used in cross-border trade.
This would tend to indicate that the overall
safety record for all Mexican trucks might be
better than that reported by the U.S.
Department of Transportation. This discrepancy
is supported by a U.S. DOT study which reported
that, of 500 Mexican trucks caught making
illegal long haul trips into the United States in
1999, fewer than 30% failed rigorous safety tests
(Mongelluzzo, 2000).
The Teamsters Union’s claim that American jobs
will be threatened is also questionable. Mexico
has about 375,000 registered commercial trucks
and 15 large motor freight carriers as compared
to approximately 7,000,000 commercial trucks
and over 400 large carriers in the United States
(Mongelluzzo, 2001). While it is possible that
Mexican trucks could secure some truckloads of
merchandise in Mexico for delivery into the
United States, Mexican carriers would need a
sales and marketing presence in the United
States to secure backhaul loads. Without
backhauls, Mexican trucks would be driving
many empty, unprofitable miles. It is highly
unlikely that only a small number of Mexican
motor carriers with modern vehicles and welltrained drivers would be able to successfully
compete with American trucking industry inside
the United States.

border locations. The purpose of this new
computer-based technology is to expedite the
flow of Mexican imports by identifying “problem”
shipments before they arrive at the port of entry.
Non-problem shipments are then processed
faster by U.S. Customs. This new system is
linked to another U.S. Customs innovation called
the Border Release Advance Screening and
Selectivity Program. This program is designed
to speed up imports made by companies who
regularly import through a given port of entry
more than fifty times a year using the same
truck and the same driver. The GAO (2002)
estimates this program applies to ten percent of
the truck traffic entering the U.S. from Mexico.
While these improvements have provided better
border inspection facilities and in some cases,
better customs procedures, inadequate border
staffing by federal agencies including the U.S.
Customs Service, DEA, USDA, and the
Immigration Service continues to be a limiting
factor for cross-border transportation. The lack
of adequate manpower at the U.S.-Mexican
border has been exacerbated by the requirement
to shore up law enforcement and security forces
along the U.S.-Canadian border following the
9/11 terrorist attacks. While homeland security
has become the most important border issue
facing the Bush Administration, President Bush
appears committed to complying in full with the
NAFTA trucking provisions.

Progress Toward Open Borders
Since 1987, the United States government has
invested approximately $370 million for capital
improvements to help facilitate cross border
truck movements. The vast majority of this
federal money has gone to the border states of
California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas to
build new ports of entry and improve/expand
existing ports of entry. New truck inspection
facilities have been built with this money and
highways near the border have been widened
(GAO, 2000).
In addition new customs
procedures have been developed and
implemented.
The U. S. Customs Service is now using a system
called the Automated Targeting System at five
18
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The Bush Administration appears to be much
more inclined to push for an opening of the U.S.
to Mexican trucking. President Bush has made
it very clear that he supports the
implementation of the NAFTA provisions despite
opposing views from the Democratic Party in
Congress. In August of 2001, the Senate voted to
impose stringent safety requirements on
Mexican trucks that travel on American
highways (Samuel, 2001). These requirements
include mandatory inspections at the United
States border and insurance provided by an U.S.
licensed insurer. The Bush administration has
pointed out that Canadian trucks are not forced
to meet these standards, which has led to claims
of discrimination from the Republican Party.
Former Republican Senate Minority leader,

Trent Lott, has called this bill “anti-Hispanic.”
President Bush has promised to veto the pending
transportation bill if these standards are
required of Mexican trucks. However, this issue
has become moot in view of recent developments.
On November 27, 2002, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) announced that the Bush
administration would begin allowing Mexicandomiciled trucking companies to apply to the
DOT for operating authority from Mexico into
the United States (Gamboa, 2002). In so doing,
President Bush modified the 1982 congressional
moratorium on Mexican trucking in the U.S. and
fulfilled U.S. obligations under NAFTA.
However, before any Mexican trucking company
can begin cross-border freight service, its service
proposal must be approved by the DOT’s new
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA).
Secretary Mineta has said the FMCSA now has
adequate border inspection facilities and trained
personnel in place to insure Mexican trucks and
drivers entering the United States comply with
the same safety standards U.S.-domiciled
trucking companies are held to (Longo, 2002).
These standards include drug and alcohol
testing, a limit on operating hours without rest
and logbooks. In addition, Mexican drivers who
operate in the U.S. must possess a Licencia
Federal, the equivalent of the U.S.’s Commercial
Driver’s License (CDL).
Mexican trucking
companies granted operating authority under
this new process will be allowed to deliver goods
originating in Mexico to any destination in the
United States and will be allowed to back-haul
freight to Mexico. Under the terms of NAFTA,
Mexico is obligated to extend the same
opportunities to U.S.-domiciled trucking
companies.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The improvements that have occurred in
Mexico’s rail freight system and the recent
decision of President Bush to open the U.S. to
Mexican motor freight transport have
implications for many sectors of both the U.S.

and Mexican economies. As of November 27,
2002, 130 Mexican-domiciled motor carriers had
applied to operate beyond the border commercial
zones in the United States (Longo, 2002). The
DOT estimates that about 60 of these motor
carriers have meet the basic requirements and
are ready for a FMCSA safety audit (Longo).
Based on these numbers it would appear the
initial impact of Mexican trucking on shippers
and competing U.S. motor carriers will be
minimal. Most Mexican motor carriers are small
and lack the capacity of the average U.S.
international trucking company. Since most
U.S. truckload carriers are larger and more
experienced in competitive markets, they will
likely benefit more than their smaller, less
experienced Mexican counterparts. Truckload
shippers in the United States will have more
service choices in moving their freight to Mexico
which may result in lower rates. It is unclear at
this point what rates Mexican motor carriers will
offer on backhauls but with lower operating
costs, it is safe to assume selected rates will be
lower than current rates being offered by U.S.
motor carriers.
U.S. motor carriers like
Schnieder and Contract Freighters, Inc. (CFI)
who have significant trucking operations to and
from the Mexican border will be most affected.
While most of the attention over NAFTA and
cross-border transportation has focused on motor
freight, the recent improvements in Mexico’s rail
industry have much broader implications for the
long term.
Rail freight transportation offers the lowest cost
alternative for many Mexican and international
companies who ship large quantities of finished
goods from Mexican assembly plants
(Maquiladoras) to U.S. and Canadian
destinations on a regular basis. Large volume
shipments of heavy manufactured goods like
automobiles and durable household goods are
best suited for rail transport. In the past, the
Mexican National Railroad was not an effective
mode for either domestic shipments or crossborder shipments. Over the last ten years
privatization of Mexico’s railroads has brought
about many service improvements. In addition,
Spring 2003
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several large U.S. and Canadian railroad
companies are now major partners with Mexican
rail interests. As intermodal improvements are
implemented, the number of carloadings and
containers moving by rail between the U.S. and
Mexico will continue to increase at a rapid pace.
In fact, under a new U.S. initiative stimulated by
NAFTA called the “Borders and Corridors”
program, the U.S. has authorized over $140
million a year in grants to facilitate efficient
cross-border rail freight movement (Hamberger,
2001). With federal encouragement, it is likely
modern freight trains will travel from Mexican
cities to U.S. cities as easily as international rail
service between the U.S. and Canada. This, of
course, will benefit North American shippers and
lower the cost of imported goods for many North
American consumers. It is likely international
rail service will provide stiff competition for
motor carriers on selected high-density routes
over 500 miles much like the case now in the
United States.

CONCLUSION
The railroad industry in Mexico has made great
progress over the past eight years. Beginning in
1994, operating rights for the state-owned
National Railway were auctioned to private
companies. The dilapidated state railroad was
divided into three main sections: the Northeast
Railroad, Mexican Railways, and the Southeast
Railroad. The remainder of the railroad was
divided into five small sections, the rights to
which were also auctioned to the public. Private
companies have invested hundreds of millions of
dollars on rolling stock, infrastructure, security,

and locomotives. Efficiency has been improved
by
reducing the labor force, eliminating
cabooses, building needed customs clearing yards
close to the border, and by streamlining
operations. Mexico has improved its railroads to
the extent that they are now competitive with
the nation’s trucking industry, which until
recently carried ninety percent of the country’s
freight.
Although the railroads have made dramatic
improvements, trucking remains the most
dominant mode of freight transportation in
Mexico. The trucking industry in Mexico has
improved to the point where the Bush
Administration has agreed to allow Mexicandomiciled motor carriers to apply for operating
authority into the United States on a regular
scheduled basis.
The Department of
Transportation, beginning in the Clinton
Administration, refused to allow Mexican trucks
to penetrate beyond fifty miles into the country
despite the provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, which specifically stated
that Mexican trucks could deliver to any point in
the United States beginning in 1996. The U.S.
Department of Transportation has said it is now
ready to process the applications and perform
the safety audits necessary to insure safety
requirements are met. Many economists believe
that the operation of Mexican trucks in the
United States will pose no threat to American
jobs. It is more likely that U.S. domiciled motor
carriers will be able to expand their inter
national routes and manpower and take
advantage of reciprocal operating rights to and
from internal Mexican markets.
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